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Abstract—This paper studies the physical layer security of a
vehicular communication network in the presence of interference
constraints by analysing its secrecy capacity. The system consid-
ers a legitimate receiver node and an eavesdropper node, within a
shared network, both under the effect of interference from other
users. The double-Rayleigh fading channel is used to capture the
effects of the wireless communication channel for the vehicular
network. We present the standard logarithmic expression for
the system capacity in an alternate form, to facilitate analysis
in terms of the joint moment generating functions (MGF)
of the random variables representing the channel fading and
interference. Closed-form expressions for the MGFs are obtained
and Monte-Carlo simulations are provided throughout to validate
the results. The results show that performance of the system
in terms of the secrecy capacity is affected by the number of
interferers and their distances. The results further demonstrate
the effect of the uncertainty in eavesdropper location on the
analysis.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secrecy capacity, inter-
ference, double Rayleigh fading channels, moment generating
functions, vehicular communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in wireless communications have brought sig-
nificant research interest in physical layer security of wireless
systems. This assertion is certainly supported by the robust
amount of literature generated on the subject, covering wide
aspects of wireless communications. For instance, performance
of secure cooperative systems over correlated Rayleigh fad-
ing channels was studied in [1], while the secrecy outage
probability over correlated composite Nakagami-m/Gamma
fading and the secrecy capacity in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers over Nakagami-m channels were considered in
[2] and [3] respectively. Furthemore, the secrecy capacity in
generalised fading has been studied over κ-µ shadowed fading
channels [4], over α-µ/κ-µ and κ-µ/α-µ fading channels [5]
and over Fisher-Snedecor F composite fading channel [6].
Physical layer security has also been invetigated in power-line
communication (PLC) systems for cooperative relaying [7] and
over correlated log-normal cooperative PLC channels [8], as
well as for RF energy harvesting in multi-antenna relaying
networks [9], to mention a few.
With respect to vehicular communications, physical layer
security of double Rayleigh fading for vehicular communi-
cations was studied in [10], while a relay-assisted mobile
network in the double Rayleigh channel was studied in [11].
The double-Rayleigh channel has particularly been shown,
from experimental measurements, to be a more appropriate
model for the high mobility of nodes in a vehicular net-
work, rather than the more common Rayleigh or Nakagami-
m distributions [12], [13]. The significance of investigating
the physical layer security in a vehicular network is crucial
due to rapid advancements towards autonomous vehicles and
smart/cognitive transportation networks to minimise the risk
from compromise. It has however been observed that the effect
of interference on the physical layer security has received
much less attention, even though interference is inherent
within shared networks [14] and has been shown to affect
the secrecy performance. For example, in [15] the effect
of interference on the secrecy capacity of a cognitive radio
(CR) network was examined, while in [16], the effect of
interference on secrecy outage probability was considered in a
Rayleigh faded channel. Studying interference is of interest in
vehicular networks because the IEEE 1609.4 standard suggests
selecting the least congested channel for data transmission
[17]. Additionally, in such highly mobile amd dense networks,
the received signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) is
routinely used as the channel quality measure along with
geocasting and other geometry-based localisation techniques
[18], [19].
From the aforementioned, this study presents two major
contributions. First, we simplify the capacity analysis of the
system under interference constraints by expressing the loga-
rithm of the SINR in a form that presents the random variables
(RVs) as a linear sum in an exponent. This allows easier anal-
ysis in terms of the joint MGFs of the RVs. We then employ
the transformation, to obtain closed-form expressions for the
moment generating function (MGF) of the joint interference
and fading channel to facilitate the analysis of various system
parameters. We evaluate the joint effects of interference and
fading on the secrecy capacity of the system in the presence of
an eavesdropper. In particular, we consider a double Rayleigh
fading channel, which has been shown from the literature to
aptly capture the channel characteristics of vehicular com-
munication networks [12], [13]. The effect of the uncertainty
of the eavesdropper location was taken into account, because
this parameter has been shown to greatly affect the analysis
[20], but has been missing from most analysis on the subject.
However, unlike [20] where the secrecy outage probability
over Rayleigh fading was studied, in this paper we study the
secrecy capacity over a double Rayleigh channel, then in order
to account for the uncertainty in the eavesdropper location,
we model its distance as a random variable (RV). It is worth
noting that to the best of our knowledge, in previous literature
on physical layer security, only the effect of the channel
fading or the interference, but not both have been considered
for highly mobile vehicular communications network. Monte
Carlo simulations are provided to verify the accuracy of our
analysis. The results show that the performance of the system
in terms of the secrecy capacity is impacted by the presence
of interfering nodes. The results further demonstrate the effect
of uncertainty in eavesdropper’s location on the analysis.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we describe
the system under study. Thereafter, in Section III, we derive
expressions for efficient computation of the secrecy capacity of
the network and derive the MGFs of the signal-to-interference
and noise ratio (SINR) in closed-form. Finally, in Sections IV
and V, we present the results and outline the main conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1: General V2V Scenario.
Consider a system of nodes operating in a vehicular net-
work. We designate three nodes of interest: the information
source vehicle (S), the information destination vehicle (D) and
a passive eavesdropper1 vehicle (E). The vehicle S transmits
information to the desired vehicle D, while E attempts to
receive and decode the confidential information. Furthermore,
the presence of other vehicular nodes operating within the
same space and frequency band, results in co-channel inter-
ference to the received signals of D and E. Moreover, while
D and E are known to lie within a certain maximum radius
1Passive eavesdropper in the sense that the node only intercepts the
information, but makes no attempt to actively disrupt, such as through
jamming.
rmax from S, the precise relative distances of the vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) links are unknown during transmission, which
is a realistic assumption for a network of this nature [10], [20].
The received signals atD and E are respectively represented
as
yD = hDx+
K∑
k=1
hDkxk+wD, (1)
yE = hEx+
K∑
k=1
hEkxk + wE , (2)
where x and xk are the respective transmitted signals by S
and the k-th interferer, with powers Ps and Pk. The terms
wD and wE are the respective additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) atD and E. Without loss of generality, we denote the
power spectral density of the AWGN as N0 and equal at both
links. The terms hi =
√
gir
−β
i i ∈ {D,E} is the channel
coefficient from S to the receiving vehicles D and E, where
ri is the V2V link distance, β is the path-loss exponent and gi
is the channel gain following double Rayleigh fading [10]. As
far as the intereferers are concerned, K denotes the number of
interference nodes, while hik =
√
gikr
−β
ik
i ∈ {D,E} is the
channel coefficient between the kth interferer at a distance rki
from the receiving node, and gik is the k-th interferer chananel
gain.
Based on (1) and (2), the instanstaneous SINRs at D and
E are given by
γD =
Ps | hD |
2∑K
k=1 Pk | hDk |
2 +N0
, (3)
and
γE =
Ps | hE |
2∑K
k=1 Pk | hEk |
2 +N0
. (4)
III. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive analytical expressions for the
secrecy capacity of the system. The maximum achievable
secrecy capacity is defined by [21]
Cs = max {CD − CE , 0} , (5)
where CD = log2 (1 + γD) and CE = log2 (1 + γE) are
the instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropping
links respectively. The secrecy capacity in (5) can therefore
be expressed as [21]
Cs =
{
log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γE) , γD > γE ,
0, γD < γE .
(6)
A. Average Secrecy Capacity
The average secrecy capacity Cs is given by [22]
Cs = E [Cs (γD, γE)]
=
∞ˆ
0
∞ˆ
0
Cs (γD, γE) f (γD, γE) dγDdγE , (7)
where E [·] is the expectation operator and f (γD, γE) is the
joint PDF of γD and γE . It is worth noting at this point that
the average in (7) is with respect to γD and γE . However,
assuming each SINR term has L RVs, then we would in turn
require at least L-fold numerical integrations to average out
the RVs {gD, gD1 . . . gDK , gE , gE1 . . . gEK , rD,rE , rD1 . . .rDk
and rE1 . . . rEk} contained within each SINR term. Obtaining
a closed-form solution would be at least arduous, if not
impossible. However, the computational complexity of the
task is greatly reduced by adopting the MGF approach, as
mentioned earlier.
We commence by expressing the logarithmic function in (5)
in an alternate form. Recalling the identity [23, Eq. (6)]
ln (1 + x) =
∞ˆ
0
1
s
(
1− e−xs
)
e−sds, (8)
and by substituting x = γD in (8), we can express the
instantaneous capacity of the main link as
CD =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
s
(
1− e
−s
Ps|hD |
2
∑K
k=1
Pk|hDk
|2+N0
)
e−sds, (9)
which after an interchange of variables s =
z
(∑K
k=1 Pk | hDk |
2 +N0
)
and some algebraic
manipulations, we obtain an expression in the desired
form with the RVs appearing only in the exponent. Thus,
CD =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e−zN0×
(
e−z
∑
K
k=1 Pk|hDk |
2
− e−zPs|hD|
2
e−z
∑
K
k=1 Pk|hDk |
2
)
dz,
(10)
and after taking the expectation, we obtain the average capac-
ity of the main link as
CD = E
[
ln
(
1 +
Ps | hD |
2∑K
k=1 Pk | hDk |
2 +N0
)]
=
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e−zN0 (MφD (z)−MχD ,φD (z)) dz,
(11)
where MφD (z) = E
[
e
−z
∑K
k=1 PkgDkr
−β
Dk
]
is the MGF
of the cumulative interference at D and MχD ,φD (z) =
E
[
e
−z
(
PsgDr
−β
D
+
∑K
k=1
PkgDk r
−β
Dk
)]
is the joint MGF of the
eavesdropping link and cumulative interference at D. Using
similar analysis, the average capacity of the eavesdropper link
can be represented as
CE =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e−zN0 (MφE (z)−MχE ,φE (z)) dz, (12)
where MφE (z) is the MGF of the cumulative interference at
E and MχE ,φE (z) is the joint MGF of the eavesdropper link
and cumulative interference at E.
From (11), (12) and (6), the alternate form for the average
secrecy capacity in (7) can be represented as
Cs =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e
−zN0 (MφD (z)−MχD ,φD (z)) dz
−
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e
−zN0 (MφE (z)−MχE ,φE (z)) dz. (13)
From (13) we observe that the integrals are symmetrical
and differ mainly in the relative locations of S, D and E.
Therefore, this signifies the importance of taking into account
the node locations in the analysis. In what follows, we compute
the MGFs presented in (13).
B. Computation of Moment Generating Functions
1) The MGF MφD (z): The MGF of the cumulative inter-
ference at D is given by MφD (z) = E
[
e
−z
∑K
k=1
PkgDk r
−β
Dk
]
,
defined by
MφD (z) = E
[
e
−z
∑K
k=1
PkgDk r
−β
Dk
]
=
K∏
k=1
E
[
e
−zPkgDk r
−β
Dk
]
=
K∏
k=1
ˆ
g
ˆ
r
e
−zPkgDk r
−β
Dk frD (r)fgD (g)drDdgD
(14)
where fgD (g) and frD(r) are the probability density functions
(PDFs) of the channel gain gDkand interferer distances rDk
respectively.
Let us start by defining a special case of the MGF in (14)
with only the RVs, given by
Mψ (z) = E
[
e
−zgDk r
−β
Dk
]
=
ˆ
g
ˆ
r
e−zgDr
−β
D frD(r)fgD (g)drDdgD, (15)
then from the generalized cascaded Rayleigh distribution, we
can obtain the PDF of the double Rayleigh channel for n = 2
in [24, Eq. (8)] as
f (g) = G2,00,2
(
1
4
g2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12
)
, (16)
where Gs,tu,v (x | · · · ) is the Meijer’s G-function [25, Eq.
(9.302)]. The node distances rD, are assumed to be uniformly
distributed within a circular region, with radius R around the
receiver, with a PDF given by [26]
f (r) =
{
2r
R2
, 0 < rD ≤ R,
0, otherwise.
(17)
Mψ (z) =
Rβ
(
2Rβ
(
1−R−2βz2
) 1
2 + 2z arcsin
(
zR−β
)
− piz
)
2 (R2β − z2) (1− z2R−2β)
1
2
−
(2z)
2
β Γ
(
1 + 1
β
)2
Γ
(
1− 2
β
)
R2
+
2piβz
Rβ

 3F2
(
3
2
, 3
2
, 1
2
− 1
β
; 1
2
, 3
2
− 1
β
; z2R−2β
)
4 (β − 2)
−
z 3F2
(
2, 2, 1− 1
β
; 3
2
, 2− 1
β
; z2R−2β
)
pi (β − 1)Rβ

 . (20)
Upon invoking [27, Eq. (2.33.10)] along with some manipu-
lations (for β > 2),2 the inner integral in (14) resolves to
Rˆ
0
e
−zgDr
−β
D
2rD
R2
drD =
R2e−zgR
−β
− (zg)
2
β Γ
(
1− 2
β
, zgR−β
)
R2
, (18)
where Γ (a, b) =
´∞
b
ta−1e−tdt is the upper incomplete
Gamma function [27, Eq. (9.14.1)]. Thus, (15) becomes
Mψ (z) =
∞ˆ
0
G
2,0
0,2
(
1
4
g
2
∣∣∣∣∣ −1
2
,1
2
)
×
R2e−zgR
−β
− (zg)
2
β Γ
(
1− 2
β
, zgR−β
)
R2
dgD, (19)
which after several manipulations can be expressed as in
(20) shown on top of the page, where pFq (α;β; z) is the
generalized hypergeometric series [27, Eq. (9.14.1)].
Therefore, using (19) in (14), we obtain the desired MGF
of interferer statistics at D as
MφD (z) =
K∏
k=1
Mψ (zPk)
= {Mψ (zPK)}
K
, (21)
where the final step in (21) was obtained by assuming identical
transmit powers for interferer nodes, such that P1 = P2 =
· · · = Pk = PK .
2) The Joint MGF MχD ,φD (z): The joint MGF
MχD ,φD (z) is given by
MχD ,φD (z) = E
[
e
−zPsgDr
−β
D
+
∑K
k=1
PkgDk r
−β
Dk
]
= E
[
e−zPsgDr
−β
D e
−z
∑K
k=1
PkgDk r
−β
Dk
]
=MχD (z)MφD (z) , (22)
whereMφD (z) is given by the expression (21) and MχD (z)
is the MGF of statistics at D. It is worth noting that the
system considered assumes the location of D is known by S.
Consequently, rD is not random and the MGF is conditioned
only on the statistics of the channel. Thus, the expected value
for the first MGF in (22) is given by
MχD (z) = E
[
exp
(
−zPsgDr
−β
D
)]
=
∞ˆ
0
e
−zPsgDr
−β
D G
2,0
0,2
(
1
4
g
2
∣∣∣∣∣ −1
2
,1
2
)
dgD. (23)
2Solution found using the method of integration by parts. For β > 2 only
the free-space model (β = 2) is excluded. Hence, this constraint is acceptable
for our purpose.
To proceed, we express (23) in a more tractable form, by
re-writing the Meijer G-function in an alternate form. Thus,
upon invoking [27, Eq. (9.304.3)], we get
G
2,0
0,2
(
1
4
g
2
∣∣∣∣∣ −1
2
,1
2
)
= gK0 (g) , (24)
where K0 (v) is the modified Bessel function of the second
kind and 0th order [27, Eq. (8.407)]. Using (24) and [27, Eq.
(6.621.3)] along with some basic algebraic manipulations, we
can straightforwardly obtain the desired result as
MχD (z) =
4
3(1 + zPsr
−β
D )
2
2F1
(
2,
1
2
,
5
2
,
zPsr
−β
D − 1
zPsr
−β
D + 1
)
, (25)
where 2F1 (α;β; γ; z) is the Gauss hypergeometric function
[27, Eq. (9.111)]. Hence, we obtainMχD ,φD (z) by substitut-
ing (20), (22) and (25) in (22).
3) The MGF MφE (z): The MGF of the cumulative inter-
ference at E is given by MφE (z) = E
[
e
−z
∑K
k=1
PkgEkr
−β
Ek
]
.
From the definition of the MGF, it can be observed that
the computation of MφE (z) follows similar analysis to the
interference at D. Due to brevity, the analysis will not be
repeated here. Thus, using (20), the desired MGF is given by
MφE (z) = {Mψ (zPK)}
K . (26)
4) The Joint MGF MχE ,φE (z): The joint MGF
MχE ,φE (z) can be obtained through similar analysis
presented in Sec. III-B2, Therefore, from (22),
MχE ,φE (z) = MχE (z)MφE (z), where MφE (z) is given
by (26). For the purpose of the system under consideration,
the exact location of E is unknown, but lies at a maximum
distance rmax from S. Using the PDFs in (16) and (17), we
obtain
MχE (z) = E
[
exp
(
−zPsgEr
−β
E
)]
=
∞ˆ
0
rmaxˆ
0
e
−zPsgEr
−β
E
2rE
r2max
G
2,0
0,2
(
1
4
g
2
∣∣∣∣∣ −1
2
,1
2
)
drEdgE. (27)
Comparing (27) and (14), shows that both expressions are
similar with maximum distance R = rmax and source power
Ps. Thus, using (20), MχE (z) = Mψ (zPs|rmax) and we
obtain from (20) and (26) the expression
MχE ,φE (z) =MχE (z)MφE (z)
=Mψ (zPs|rmax) {Mψ (zPK)}
K
. (28)
To recap, the average secrecy capacity is obtained from (13)
by substituting the relevant MGFs from (20), (22), (25), (26)
and (28).
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Figure 2: Average Secrecy Capacity versus Number of Interferers K ,
with varied maximum eavesdropper radius rmax.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present and discuss some results from
the mathematical expressions derived in the paper. We then
investigate the effect of key parameters on the secrecy capacity
of the system. The results are then verified using Monte
Carlo simulations with at least 106 iterations. Unless otherwise
stated, we have assumed source power Ps = 10W, interferer
transmit power PK = 10W, S-to-D distance rD = 4m,
maximum eavesdropper distance rmax = 10m, maximum
interferer distance R = 20m and pathloss exponent β = 2.7.
In Fig. 2, we present a plot of the average secrecy capacity
against the number of interfering sources in the network. It
can be observed from the results that the number of active
interfering nodes have a negative impact on the secrecy
capacity, with the highest secrecy capacity available when
there is no interfering node (K = 0) and rapidly reduces with
interference. Moreover, this impact can be effective at various
eavesdropper distances from the node, as seen when rmax is
increased. It should be noted that the parameter rmax is a proxy
for the uncertainty of E’s location. In a practical scenario, a
vehicle is more likely to know the location of the node D
in which it establishes communication as against a passive
eavesdropper whose presence may not be known. Therefore,
we assume both D and E are always within the radius rmax,
while the interferer nodes are restricted by a larger outer radius
of R. Therefore the increased secrecy observed when rmax
increases indicates that when E is more likely to be closer to
S-to-D V2V link, then the secrecy is compromised, and vice
versa.
Fig. 3, shows a plot of the average secrecy capacity against
the S-to-D distance rD , with different values of Ps and rmax.
We assume R = 40m and 5 interfering nodes. First, we
observe that the average secrecy capacity decreases as D
moves away from S, which is expected because the SINR at
D is also decreasing. Next, we see the effect of increasing the
maximum range of E. At the different Ps values, we observe
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Figure 3: Average Secrecy Capacity versus source to destination (S-to-
D link) for varied source transmit power Ps and known eavesdropper
distance rE .
that increasing rmax improves the secrecy capacity because
this means the likely radius of finding E is extended. However,
as rmax is reduced, the secrecy capacity rapidly decreases and
reaches zero approximately when rD = 1/2rmax. This shows
the significance of the relative locations of S, D and E. To
further demonstrate this, we assume a known location for E
and use this distance rE to illustrate the significance of our
result with respect to interferer impact on secrecy. We assume
rE = 10m and plot the exact secrecy capacity for the V2V
network, through simulations. From Fig. 3, it can be observed
that the secrecy capacity for known rE is much superior to
the case when E’s location is uncertain. In fact, from our
analysis, it can be seen that the secrecy capacity at rE = 10m
is equivalent to the secrecy capacity when rmax = 25m within
the region studiesd. This therefore signifies the importance
of taking into account the uncertainty of the location of E,
especially for the security analysis of passive eavesdroppers,
when the eavesdropper is unlikely to give away its position by
transmissions.
In Fig. 4, we present the average secrecy capacity with
respect to Ps for different number of interfering nodes K and
maximum interferer range R. As expected, the secrecy capac-
ity increases monotonically with increased Ps. Furthermore,
within the region investigated, the average secrecity capacity
is highest without any interfering nodes and degrades with
more active interfering nodes, as already demonstrated in the
previous figure. Additionally, it can be observed that for the
same number of interferers, increasingR, improves the secrecy
capacity of the system. Given that both S and E are affected
by the interference in the network, then an increased radius of
interferers, reduces the density of interfering nodes, which in
turn improves the secrecy capacity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the impact of interference on the
secrecy capacity as a key metric for physical layer security of a
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Figure 4: Average Secrecy Capacity versus Source Transmit Power Ps
for varied interferer numbers K and maximum interferer distances R.
wireless vehicular communication network. Due to the nature
of the network and statistics of the SINR, we expressed the
capacity in terms of the MGF of the RVs representing the joint
fading and random distances of interfering nodes, and eaves-
dropper node. This reduced the complexity of the solution. We
found closed-form expressions for the various MGFs and used
these expressions to calculate the average secrecy capacity of
the system. The close agreement between the analytical and
simulated results clearly indicated the validity of the derived
expressions. The results demonstrated the effect of some key
system parameters such as the distances of the V2V node dis-
tances and eavesdropper, as well as the number and distances
of interference nodes. The results showed the importance of
the analysis with respect to considering uncertainty of the
eavesdropper location, by showing a significant reduction in
secrecy capacity when location of eavesdropper is not known.
The results also showed the effect of interfering nodes on
the security of the system, there by further highlighting the
importance of our analysis.
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